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Program Objectives
• X-43A project was designed to be the first ever flight 
demonstration of an airframe-integrated, hydrogen fueled, 
scramjet powered, hypersonic vehicle
• Gather flight data to validate the tools, test and analysis 
techniques, and methodology for designing scramjet 
powered, hypersonic vehicles
• Verify predicted scramjet performance
• Collect propulsion, aerodynamic, thermal, and structural data 
for future hypersonic vehicle design
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Project Overview
• Designed to be High-Risk/High-
Payoff
• Three-flight Project
» 2 at Mach 7
» 1 at Mach 10
• Scaled version of a Mach 10 
“cruise” configuration
• Air launched on a highly modified 
Pegasus booster
• initially using same Orion 50S 
motor to minimize booster 
modifications
• 7 year project (1996 – 2004)
• ~ $230M investment
• ~ 220+ people worked the project at 
any given time
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Project Team
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Project Approach
• A Risk Management based approach was applied to 
project execution
• Doing things that had never been done before
– Many before we got to the experiment
• The program/project took all practical steps to minimize 
risks 
– Significant risks remained that were “inherent”
– Most systems were single string
• Risks were mitigated to maximum practical extent by:
– Weighing alternative approaches with down selection
– Design for robustness
– Extensive testing throughout the project
– Multiple internal and independent checks along the way
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Risk Management Approach
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Applied to…Never Done That Before!
Booster Operation Outside
“Normal” Flight Profile 
High Mach/High q
Non-axisymmetric Separation
Hypersonic Flight Powered by an
Airframe-integrated Scramjet Engine
Programmatic Lessons
• Define and agree to organizational roles and 
responsibilities before activity begins
– The more organizations the more important this 
becomes
• Define and agree to program objectives and 
success criteria early
– Review these regularly, as you do learn things along 
the way
• Use established program management tools and 
processes
– Innovation with these AND with the technology makes 
life really difficult
– Remember…They work for you, Not you for them
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System Integration
Propulsion
•Fuel system
•Scramjet engine
•Propulsion control laws
•Environmental system
Systems
•Flight computers
•Actuators
•Power
•Software
•V & V testing
LV, Sep, & RV Sims
•GNC & PSC design & testing
•Monte-Carlo analyses
•Vehicle performance
•S/W & H/W testing
•HIL/AIL testing
•Mission control room training
Stage Separation
•Never been done 
•High q, asymmetric bodies
Aerodynamics
•Outer mold line design
•Aero data base – testing & CFD
GNC
•LV, Sep, & RV control laws
Structures
•Aero & thermal  loads
•FEM modeling
•Structural analysis & design
Launch Vehicle
•The ride to Mach 7 and 10
•Modified Pegasus booster
Flight Operations
•Puts it all together
•Vehicle integration, fueling, 
flight, ground, & control room 
ops
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Systems Engineering Lessons
• Define and agree to design and operational 
standards early
• Ensure appropriate focus at the interfaces
– Hardware
– Software
– Disciplines
• COTS
– For a development program there is no shelf
– Heritage parts used outside of their intended/proven 
application - even slightly - don’t have a heritage
– Arrange for vendors of critical hardware/software to 
be on site during testing
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System Engineering Lessons
• Identify test and flight safety requirements early 
and integrate them
– Remember the unmanned system may not always be 
unmanned
• Test what you fly…Fly what you test
– But try not to use the flight hardware as the test article
– Ground tests can be more strenuous to the hardware 
than the flight
• Define and agree to clear test and success 
requirements
• Review ALL test data
– You may learn things even in a nominal test
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Flight Test System
Stack = HXLV + Adapter + HXRV
X-43A
Hyper-X Research Vehicle
Hyper-X Launch Vehicle 
Modified Pegasus Booster
Adapter
B-52B
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Operations Lessons
• Plan for vehicle maintenance
– Removing all vehicle systems to work on the top of 
the engine is not efficient
– Spares can make you or break you
• Maintenance and operations procedures are 
also a development effort…treat them as such
• When you have limited operations using all 
system assets with “Feast or Famine” timelines
– Plan for dedicated training opportunities
– Treat every system test as a mission training 
opportunity
– Conduct nominal and off-nominal Missions 
simulations with all organizations
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Mission
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– 11 organizations
– 6 aircraft + Hyper-X Stack
– 2 ranges + FAA controlled 
space
– Days of Ground Ops and Coordination
– An hour plus to get to the launch point
Flight 1 Mission Profile
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Getting	Proper	Format	Clip	from	Video
Flight 1 – June 2, 2001
Control Surface Departure
At ~13 seconds after drop 
booster departed controlled flight
The right fin broke off, followed, 
within one second, by left fin 
and rudder
HXLV FTS was initiated 48 seconds after launch and 
caused the uncommanded “separation” of the X-43A
The X-43A continued to transmit data until 77 seconds after launch, 
which is consistent with the time splash occurred
16
Lesson Re-Learned
No matter how often you've done something...
No matter how experienced you are...
Things can go wrong!!!
* No actual beavers were harmed 
in the making of this slide
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…9 months later
• Following the incident, the X-43A Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) 
was convened June 5, 2001 and ended March 8, 2002
“The X-43A HXLV failed because the vehicle control system design was 
deficient for the trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models 
which overestimated the system margins”
-- Root Cause MIB Report dated 3/8/2003
• Modeling deficiencies caused an over-prediction of autopilot stability 
margins:
– Fin Actuation System Compliance
– Launch Vehicle Aerodynamics
– Mispredicted roll inertia (Ixx)
• Over-prediction of fin actuator torque margin
– Misprediction of aerodynamic hinge moments
• Other areas for improvement
– Validation/Cross Checking/Reviews
– Documentation
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Post Mishap Lessons
• Co-locate a core team of key stakeholders
– The location(s) may change throughout the life of the 
program
– More information transfer tends to happen in the 
hallway than on telecons
• Strive to maintain the team
– Replacing team members in the middle of a smaller, 
fast moving program will have impact
• Constraints Change
– Things “not possible” prior to Flight 1 suddenly became available 
as options
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Return to Flight Approach
Propellant Offload
Dual Motor Actuator
More Pegasus Like Trajectory
40 kft and Mach 0.8
Too Much Energy
Too Little Torque• Review / improve all models for LV, Sep, & RV
» Emphasis on the aero and FAS models
» 12 additional wind tunnel test runs
» Independent Simulations
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Return To Flight Approach 
• Higher fidelity models
• Increase AOA for 
flameout robustness and 
greater thrust
• Upgrade engine control 
logic for  unstart 
robustness
• Adapter fluid systems 
improvements
• Redesign of wing control 
horns
• Aircraft-in-the-loop timing 
tests
• Independent Simulation 
Review
Research Vehicle
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COOLANT SYSTEM
BATTERY
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
SILANE SYSTEM
NITROGEN (PURGE)
SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION STACK
SCRAMJET ENGINE
FLIGHT MANAGEMENT UNIT
Absolute PPTs
S-BAND TRANSMITTER
C-BAND TRANSPONDER
ACTUATORS &
CONTROLLER
Flight 3 Approach
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• The Flight 3 hardware was worked in parallel with Flight 2
• Final models and analysis were not available until after Flight 2 and initial 
post-flight analysis was complete
• Quick turnaround, goal for flight was 6 months after initial model release in 
early April
– Capitalized on recent Flight 2 experience and Return-to-Flight Approach
– Team remained mostly intact
– Tests and procedures went faster than they did for flight 2
• Assumptions 
– Do very little independent analysis (i.e. no duplication of effort)
– Look at Flight 2 data to determine what Flight 3 modification would be 
necessary for success
– Models would not be updated based on flight data. The flight data would be 
used for guidance for modifications and for stress cases
– Engine test region was primary objective and therefore was the highest priority
• Flight 3 approach was success oriented and assumed no major issues
Flight 2 & 3 Mission Profile
MACH 9.6 (3-7 sec)
~110,000 ft
(3 sec)
NONE
-0.5 g’s
2.5 g’s
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~815 sec~90 sec ~100 sec ~110 sec
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Flight 2 – March 27, 2004
• All systems on both the LV and X-43A 
functioned well throughout the flight
• Maximum Powered Mach 6.83
• X-43 airframe drag (and lift) were 
higher than expected, but w/i
uncertainties
• Scramjet engine performance within 
3% of predictions – achieved net 
positive thrust
• Data quality was very good and 
acquired all the way to splash down 25
Flight 3 – November 16, 2004
• All systems on both LV and X-43A 
performed well throughout the flight
• Maximum powered Mach 9.68
• During engine operation the vehicle 
achieved cruise condition, sustained 
thrust equal to drag
• The data collected during the engine 
test was by far the largest amount of 
data acquired for a Mach 10 scramjet. 
The quantity, quality, and type of the 
data acquired is well beyond what had 
been acquired in wind tunnels
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The Best Lessons
Scramjets Work AND Flight Test Is Still Necessary
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Questions ?
